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ducing the right design is costly. We model such infrastructure projects taking into
account their credence goods feature and the costly design effort they require and
examine the performance of commonly used contracting methods. We show that
when building costs are homogeneous and public information, simultaneous bidding
involving shortlisting of two contractors and contingent compensation of both con-
tractors on design efforts outperforms sequential search. If building costs are private
information of the contractors and are revealed to them after design cost is sunk,
sequential search may be superior to simultaneous bidding.
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1 Introduction
Large infrastructure projects, such as public transportation, public utility facility and
environmental restoration, are often initiated by government. The complexity of these in-
frastructure projects is typically beyond the expertise of government, whereas contractors
usually have the needed expertise due to these firms’ specialization.1 Project outcomes
are to a large extent nonverifiable—anecdotes abound in which a defect in design or im-
plementation is not discovered until the project has been in use for many years. As a
result, contracting for infrastructure projects exhibits the feature of credence goods:2 on
the one hand it involves eliciting from potential contractors information about which way
of implementation fits the need of the procurer the best; on the other hand, whether the
services provided fit the best need of the procurer is ex post nonverifiable, and thus it is
impossible to condition the contract upon the outcome of the project.3
Furthermore, these infrastructure projects typically involve nontrivial and costly pre-
build design. Most existing contributions incorporating pre-build design leave aside the
costly design problem by either assuming costless design or design effort is observable
and a fair design fee can be imposed. Even if the buyer could offer some design, such
design maybe incomplete and extensive contractor efforts are required to make such design
workable.
We extend the public procurement literature by exploring infrastructure projects’ cre-
dence goods nature, while incorporating a costly pre-build design phase with unobservable
design effort in the procurement process. In our model, a project requires nontrivial input
of the suppliers before it is built. The input of the suppliers can be a design of the project,
a construction plan or a choice of the implementation method to meet a specified outcome
requested by the procurer. All of these need to take into account the characteristics of the
environment specific to the project, requiring effort to collect crucial information. In the
following, we refer to such “input” by contractors as the “design”. Producing a design
is costly to contractors. The government procurer’s objective is two-fold: 1) finding a
contractor who produces, at a cost, the right design; 2) finding a contractor offering a low
price for the building of the project. We analyze the performance of two commonly used
contracting methods: simultaneous bidding and sequential search.4
The relative performance of simultaneous bidding and sequential search depends on
whether the building costs are heterogeneous and whether they are private information
pertaining to contractors. We show that when building costs are homogeneous and public
information, simultaneous bidding involving shortlisting of two contractors and contingent
1Often times the government initially has no clue about the design, and it is the contractor or a third
party design house that provides a candidate design. We focus on the former case in this paper.
2Darby and Karni (1973) first introduce the term “credence goods” to refer to the type of goods or
services where a buyer does not know the exact specification of the goods or services she needs while the
supplier is able to determine this need. Besides infrastructure projects, medical services, repair services
and various types of consulting and advisory services belong to this broad category. For studies on
credence goods, see, for example, Pitchik and Schotter (1987), Wolinsky (1995), Emons (1997), Fong
(2005), Alger and Salanié (2006), Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009). Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006)
provide a comprehensive survey of the research done on this topic.
3As argued by Leslie Ruddock, “Construction goods are typically quasi-credence goods · · · in such
relationships, the principal employs an agent for a specific task and the agent possesses information that
is not available to the principal · · · ”. See Ruddock (2008), p.171.
4We do refer to the traditional Design-Build approach as well. Given its obvious incentive problems,
we only have a short discussion on its inefficiency at the end of Section 2.
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compensation of both contractors on design efforts outperforms sequential search because
there is lack of commitment under the latter. If building costs are private information of
the contractors and are revealed to them after design cost is sunk, sequential search may
be superior to simultaneous bidding.
In the rest of the paper, we first present the model in Section 2. In Section 3-5, we
analyze in sequence the equilibrium of simultaneous bidding and sequential search and
compare their performances under the assumption that building costs are homogeneous
and public information. In Section 6, we examine the case that building costs are het-
erogenous and private information. In Section 7, we discuss an alternative formulation of
procurer utility and the case with finite number of suppliers.
Related Literature To our knowledge, this paper is the first to account for the cre-
dence goods feature in public infrastructure contracting, while providing a comprehensive
analysis of the two common contracting approaches with and without asymmetric in-
formation about the building cost. Our paper is most closely related to Pesendorfer and
Wolinsky (2003) (referred to as PW) which study the case where the design effort is costly
and unobservable, and contractors need to be incentivized to invest in design effort. The
main difference is that they focus on the sequential search mechanism assuming publicly
known constant building cost, while we analyze the performance of two different methods
under two different information structures.
Our paper is also related to the literature on auction theory that considers the usage
of shortlisting to recruit firms as participants in an auction where shortlisted firms are
reimbursed for bid preparation costs. Kaplan and Sela (2006) study reimbursements in
the framework of a second-price auction. Gal, Landsberger, and Nemirovski (2007) and
Fan and Wolfstetter (2008) look at first-price auction. In these contributions, the contract
to be auctioned does not have the feature of credence goods—the buyer knows perfectly
the design she needs. There, shortlisting serves the purpose of screening contractors. In
our setup, due to the credence goods feature, shortlisting has a very different function
—it serves as a commitment device to consult a second contractor.
Finally, there is also a large engineering economics literature on the management
of infrastructure contracting. Most of these papers either take an empirical approach
by collecting data from projects implemented through Design-Build5 or other delivery
methods and analyzing the common factors that might be critical to the success of those
methods (see, for example, Gordon (1994), Ndekugri and Turner (1994), Molenaar and
Songer (1998), Molenaar, Songer, and Barash (1999), and El Wardani, Messner, and
Horman (2006)), or take a survey approach by collecting and summarizing interviewing
results with experts (see, for example, Akintoye and Fitzgerald (1995)). We complement
this literature by formalizing an economics model that resonates with their empirical
findings.
2 Description of the Model
The government wishes to develop an infrastructure project, but is uncertain about which
design of the project is appropriate.6 The range of possible designs is [0, 1]. The gov-
5The mechanisms we analyze are different variants of the Design-Build approach.
6The model is adapted from PW.
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ernment benefits from the delivered project a only if it matches her type α ∈ [0, 1]. Her
utility is V > 0 if α = a and 0 if α 6= a. The government does not know her own type α
and has a uniform prior on [0, 1]. Thus, an unguided guess will not yield the right choice
with a positive probability.
There is an infinite population of identical contractors, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,+∞}.
Contractors serve a dual role: they recommend a design of the project to the government
and, if chosen by the government, build the project according to the recommended de-
sign. As in PW, we assume that a design can only be implemented by the contractor
who recommends it. The assumption ensures that the government cannot first learn
the appropriate design and then instruct an arbitrary contractor (who did not provide
a high-quality design) to build the project. In other words, under this assumption the
design cannot uniquely identify the project to be implemented. One reason for such an
assumption is that part of the design stage involves collecting crucial information to carry
out the project that is not part of the official design, such as measurements of certain
characteristics of the site.7
The design of the project is costly to produce for the contractors. For simplicity, the
contractors must choose high or low design effort. High design effort leads to the correct
design α. Low design effort leads to a random design drawn from a uniform distribution
on [0, 1].8 The cost of high design effort is c > 0 and the cost of low design effort is zero.
The procurer bears a search cost of s for each contractor it samples. Denote by
γi ∈ [0, γ¯] the building cost of the project. For Sections 3-5, we assume that contractors
are homogeneous in their building cost and that cost is public information, thus normalized
to zero, i.e., γi = 0 for all i. We analyze the case with private building costs in Section 6.
We assume that V ≥ c+ s+ γ¯, i.e., in a first best case it is always efficient to discover
and build the right project. Throughout the paper we assume that it is verifiable whether
a built project is identical to a proposed design. Thus, if a contractor is awarded the
building contract with a certain design, he is bound to build the project according to
the design. This nevertheless does not guarantee that the proposed design is appropriate
and fits the best need of the government. In the following, we use ai to denote a design
proposed by a supplier i and the project he delivers if he is awarded the building contract.
We further assume that whether a delivered project meets the true needs of the pro-
curer is nonverifiable though true needs or a mismatch might be observable to the govern-
ment ex post. Thus, it is not possible for the procurer and a supplier to write a contract
that is contingent upon the suitability of a delivered project.
There are two sources of incentive problems: 1) the government cannot observe the
contractors’ design effort and hence cannot be certain whether the design recommended
by a particular contractor is the right one; and 2) the contractors have more information
about the government’s problem after the design phase.
We refer to an equilibrium as non-degenerate if contractors choose high design effort
7Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) refer to such a case as “commitment”—and explicitly model it as
high economies of scale between diagnosis and delivery of service.
8Note that the model does not leave the experts discretion over their recommendations: if the contrac-
tor invests high design effort, he learns the true α and the design he delivers has to be correct, otherwise,
it has to be a random draw from a uniform distribution and the design will be wrong with certainty. This
is for the purpose of avoiding uninteresting multiplicities in the communication between contractors and
the government, it also rules out collusion by simple copying of one firm’s low effort plan between two or
more firms. This assumption makes sense if copying a plan without detection by government is a high
effort task.
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with strictly positive probability, and an equilibrium as degenerate if all contractors choose
low design effort.
The following Lemma summarizes the social efficiency benchmark when the contrac-
tors are homogeneous in the building cost.
Lemma 1 (Efficiency Benchmark). If the contractors are homogeneous in the building
cost, social efficiency implies that only one contractor is sampled, that contractor spends
high design effort and comes up with the right design, and the right design is implemented.
Note that under the widely used traditional Design-Build approach, the design and
the build of a project are contracted to a single contractor. The contractor can be either
selected through simultaneous bidding, sequential bargaining, or random draw. The de-
sign phase is carried out after a contractor is selected and a price for the build is fixed.
As a result, a selected contractor will always choose low design effort. This observation
is in line with the prevalent concern in the engineering literature—Design-Build sacrifices
quality and design innovation.9
3 Simultaneous Bidding
Under simultaneous bidding, several shortlisted contractors are asked to submit a proposal
simultaneously: a design and a price quote for the delivery of the project. If a design
in consensus emerges, the project will then be awarded to the one who has quoted the
lowest price for the building of the project. The game proceeds as follows.
1. Shortlisting Stage. The government randomly samples n contractors from the con-
tractor pool. The set of sampled contractors is denoted as K = {1, · · · , n}. If all
designs match on a > 0, the government commits to (i) paying the design fee d
to each selected contractor and (ii) awarding the contract to one of the selected
contractors through simultaneous bidding.
2. Design Stage. Sampled contractors simultaneously choose design effort ei ∈ {0, 1}.
Contractor i learns α if ei = 1 and obtains no information on α if ei = 0. xi denotes
the probability that a contractor chooses ei = 1.
3. Bidding Stage. Each contractor submits a plan (ai, pi), where ai is the design con-
tractor i recommends and pi is the price he charges for the implementation of that
design.
4. Building Stage. The government learns about the plans. If ai = aj > 0 for all
i, j ∈ K, the government chooses the contractor with the lowest price to build
the project, and pays him the price he has quoted plus the design fee d. The
9In practice the moral hazard problem may be mitigated, for example, through reputation, certification
of the architects, or repeated interaction. Despite that, too little design effort is still a concern when
Design-Build approach is used. See, for example, Akintoye and Fitzgerald (1995). In Wikipedia, it is
reported that design and price selected through Design-Build approach arouses public suspicion and can
lead to loss of public confidence. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Design-build. Dulleck, Kerschbamer,
and Sutter (2011) document experiments where experts’ reputation does not help to increase market
efficiency.
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losing contractors receive design fee d. Otherwise, the government quits the market
without carrying out the project and no design fee is paid.10
At the building stage the project is only implemented if there is a consensus in design
emerging among contractors and that contractors are reimbursed only if the project is
implemented. This matches the common practice that if experts’ opinions diverge too
much, a project is usually dropped or postponed, and experts may not get reimbursed for
their previous inputs. Reimbursing the design effort cost at the building stage corresponds
to the common practice of reimbursing bidding cost when bid preparation is costly.
Use pl to denote the lowest price from simultaneous bidding. The government’s payoff
is: 

V − nd− pl − ns if ai = aj = α, ∀i, j ∈ K;
−nd− pl − ns if ai = aj 6= α, ∀i, j ∈ K;
−ns otherwise
where α is the government’s true type.
A contractor i who has been sampled by the government receives the following payoff
given his strategy (xi, ai, pi):

d+ pi − xieic if ai = aj and pi ≤ min pj , ∀j ∈ K, j 6= i;
d− xieic if ai = aj and pi > min pj , ∀j ∈ K, j 6= i;
−xieic otherwise.
3.1 Equilibria and Efficiency
The strategy of the government is to choose the contingent design fee d and the number
of shortlisted contractors n. The strategy of a sampled contractor i is a triple, (xi, ai, pi),
where xi is the probability that contractor i chooses high design effort, ai is the design he
recommends, and pi is the price he proposes for implementing the design ai.
Note that there always exists a degenerate equilibrium in which none of the shortlisted
contractors chooses high design effort, that is xi = 0, i ∈ K. Each player gets 0 payoff
in such an equilibrium. It is more interesting to examine a non-degenerate equilibrium
where contractors spend positive design effort.
Social efficiency requires that only one contractor spends high design effort and the
right design is produced. Notice that given the other sampled contractors choose low
design effort, it is a best response for a contractor to choose low effort as well on being
sampled. Thus, there does not exist any pure strategy equilibrium in which exactly one of
the contractors chooses high design effort. This excludes the possibility that full efficiency
is achieved through the simultaneous bidding game described above.
Lemma 2. There exists no equilibrium in which one and only one sampled contractor
chooses high design effort with strictly positive probability.
10The equilibrium outcome remains the same if the project is implemented as long as two contractors’
designs match. But mathematical expressions become much more complex. In the model we assume that
the design fee is paid only if designs match. Alternatively, the government can pay design fee to every
sampled contractors and award the building contract contingent upon matching designs. Note that a
fixed design fee itself does not provide incentive for high design effort, thus the building price has to leave
sufficient rent to compensate a contractor for high design effort. There we would expect an equilibrium
with zero design fee but higher price for building.
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Nevertheless, when the cost of search and design is sufficiently low, full efficiency can
be nearly implemented, at the expense of some extra design effort and search cost. For
this purpose we focus on the existence of an equilibrium where all the sampled contractors
choose high design effort in the following analysis.
Lemma 3. If each sampled contractor chooses high design effort at the design stage, the
equilibrium strategy for each contractor i ∈ K at the bidding stage is (ai, pi) = (α, 0).
Proof. Given that all the shortlisted contractors have chosen the high design effort at
the design stage, suppose all the other contractors follow the recommended strategy of
aj = α. Contractor i, by recommending ai = α, may become the winner in the bidding
game and receives some nonnegative price for building the project in addition to getting
reimbursed for the design fee d. By recommending otherwise, the designs will not match
and contractor i gets 0 payoff. Hence recommending ai = α is the best response for
contractor i. Given ai = α for all sampled contractors, it is a mutual best response
to submit a bid which is equal to the marginal cost of implementing the recommended
design, as in a standard Betrand competition.
The next lemma shows that at the design stage, there indeed exists an equilibrium
where all the sampled contractors choose high design effort if the design fee set by the
government is sufficiently high.
Lemma 4. If d ≥ c, there is a pure strategy equilibrium at the design stage in which each
sampled contractor chooses high design effort.
Proof. Given that the other contractors have chosen high design effort, choosing high
design effort as well leads to a net payoff of d− c ≥ 0, while choosing a low design effort
leads to a payoff of 0. Therefore, choosing high design effort is a best response to the high
design effort of other contractors.
Finally, one has to find out the optimal design fee and the optimal number of shortlist-
ing for the government. The contingent design fee ensures that all the sampled contractors
will participate in the game.
Proposition 1 (Pure Strategy Equilibrium). If c + s ≤ V
2
, there exists a non-
degenerate equilibrium in which the government shortlists two contractors and chooses the
contingent design fee d = c. In this equilibrium: (i) both shortlisted contractors participate
in the game and choose high design effort; (ii) each contractor submits a design that
truthfully reveals the need of the government and a price that equals marginal cost of zero;
(iii) each contractor is chosen to implement the design with equal probability at the final
building stage.
Proof. Given the non-degenerate equilibrium of the game at the bidding stage, a contrac-
tor’s profit from building the project is 0. His entire profit therefore comes from the design
fee. A contractor’s expected payoff from participating in the game is −c + d, expecting
that he himself and his competitors will choose high design effort and their recommended
designs will match. Hence, as long as d ≥ c, the contractors’ individual rationality con-
straints are satisfied and each of them is happy to participate in the game. Since the
government’s payoff is strictly decreasing in her payment to the contractors, the optimal
design fee she will choose is d = c. Finally, since two contractors are sufficient to ensure a
correct design, the government will only sample two contractors if the total procurement
cost does not exceed the value of the project, i.e. V ≥ 2(d+ s).
7
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Note that there exists at the same time a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium where
the sampled contractors choose design effort with x ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition 2 (Mixed Strategy Equilibrium). If c + s ≤ V
2
, there exists a non-
degenerate symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies. The government shortlists two con-
tractors. In this equilibrium, both shortlisted contractors participate in the game and
choose high design effort with probability x = c
d+c
. The right project is delivered with
probability ( c
d+c
)2.
Proof. Note that given all designs match, the building price is driven down to zero, as
in Proposition 1, given design fee d. Suppose contractor j, j 6= 1 chooses high design
effort with probability x. For player 1, choosing the high design effort leads to a payoff of
xn−1d + (1 − xn−1)(−c). Player 1 is indifferent between choosing e1 = 1 and e1 = 0 in a
mixed strategy equilibrium, thus xn−1d+ (1− xn−1)(−c) = 0 delivering x = ( c
d+c
)
1
n−1 . In
the same way, one can get the randomizing strategy of every sampled contractor. Given
the strategies of the contractors, the procurer’s payoff is(
c
c+ d
) n
n−1
(V − n(d+ s)) (1)
For n ≥ 2, this is decreasing in n and d. Thus, the optimal design fee is d = c and the
optimal number of contractors to be sampled is 2.
Note that under the mixed strategy equilibrium in Proposition 2, if d increases, the
probability that a sampled contractor chooses high design effort decreases, and his ex-
pected payoff remains zero, while under the pure strategy equilibrium in Proposition 1, a
sampled contractor’s payoff is strictly positive if d > c. For the procurer, the pure strat-
egy equilibrium strictly dominates the mixed strategy equilibrium. The procurer with
c + s < V/2 needs to set the design fee marginally above c to coordinate on the pure
strategy nondegenerate equilibrium.
Proposition 1 shows that n = 2 is the optimal number for shortlisting when building
costs are homogeneous and public information. Two contractors are sufficient to drive the
building price down to its marginal cost as in Betrand competition.11
Corollary 1. If c+ s ≤ V/2, the social loss of the simultaneous bidding game is c+ s.
When the design effort cost and search cost are sufficiently low, social loss from the
simultaneous bidding game is negligible. Shortlisting two contractors and the contingent
design fee together are sufficient to ensure that both sampled contractors participate in the
game and both choose high design effort to produce the right design for the government.
One may argue that the two sampled contractors may collude with each other with
one firm copying the other firm’s design, leading to the wrong design. This problem may
be overcome if the procurer reveals the identity of the contractors only after the contract
has been awarded. In practice, for certain infrastructure projects, copying a design in a
non-obvious way may also require more effort than using a random (past) design, making
collusion costly for one of the colluding partners. Furthermore, colluding becomes more
difficult when the building costs are private information and more than two contractors
are consulted in equilibrium, as in the case of Section 6.
11It may be optimal to shortlist more than two contractors if, after investing, each contractor comes up
with a design that is a noisy estimate of the right one, or if contractors have private information about
their building costs. The latter case is analyzed in Section 6.
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4 Sequential Search
Under sequential search, the government elicits sequentially a proposal (a design and a
price quote) from each contractor. There, design and build are also awarded to the same
contractor and multiple contractors may be requested to submit a design and a price
quote. As analyzed by PW, the game involves an infinite number of discrete periods with
each period unfolding as follows:
1. A contractor is chosen at random and offers a contract (d, p) where d is the design
fee and p the price for implementing the design. If accepted, a contract requires
the government to pay d to the contractor. In return, the contractor recommends a
design and the government has the option to procure the project from the contractor
at price p at any future date.
2. The government decides on one of the following actions: (i) accept or reject the
contract and continue to sample; (ii) accept or reject the contract and procure the
project from some contractor whose contract the government previously accepted;
(iii) quit the project.
3. If the government accepts the contract, she pays the fee d and incurs a cost s > 0.
4. If a contract is accepted, the contractor chooses the design effort e ∈ {0, 1}. The
contractor may randomize between the two effort levels with x ∈ [0, 1], the proba-
bility of high design effort.
5. If a contract is accepted, the government learns the contractor’s recommended de-
sign.
Remark 1 (Proposition 1 in PW). Under sequential search, there does not exist an
equilibrium in which a contractor chooses high design effort with probability 1.
If the government only samples one contractor, the sampled contractor will choose
low design effort, and the right design will not be produced. If the government instead
samples two contractors in sequence, each contractor knows that the other contractor
will or has been sampled, and will therefore choose high design effort. However, for the
government, expecting that the first sampled contractor chooses high design effort, will
not sample a second contractor. As a result, there does not exist an equilibrium in which
the government always samples more than one contractor and each sampled contractor
chooses high design effort.
Under sequential search, as shown in proposition 1 of PW, when search cost s is
sufficiently low and c + s
m
≤ V
2
, where m ∈ (0, 1) is the larger root of quadratic function
V x2−(V +s)x+2s = 0, there exists an equilibrium where the government samples a second
contractor with positive probability strictly less than 1, and each sampled contractor
chooses high design effort with positive probability strictly less than 1. The outcome of
the equilibrium is that the right design is delivered with probability strictly less than 1.
9
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5 Welfare Comparison
By Lemma 1, if the building costs are homogeneous, social efficiency requires that the
right design be implemented if and only if V ≥ c+ s. As we see from the above analysis,
for V ∈ [c + s, 2(c + s)), none of the two approaches elicits high design effort from the
contractors. Hence, none of the approaches achieves full efficiency.
For V ≥ 2(c + s), simultaneous bidding has an equilibrium in which two sampled
contractors choose high design effort and the right design is produced and implemented.
In comparison, sequential search elicits high design effort and the right design with positive
probability less than 1 for a subset of V ≥ 2(c + s). As PW shows in their proposition
2, the equilibrium of sequential search does not deliver the second best outcome in which
the procurer samples a second supplier with probability 1. Therefore, for V ≥ 2(c + s),
simultaneous bidding is superior to sequential search.
Proposition 3. If V ∈ [c+s, 2(c+s)), neither sequential search nor simultaneous bidding
elicits positive design effort from the contractors. If V ≥ 2(c + s), simultaneous bidding
is superior to sequential search.
Under sequential search, the government is unable to commit to sample a specific
number of contractors. This absence of commitment results in the social inefficiency that
the probability of high design effort is always less than 1. Under simultaneous bidding,
the government is able to commit to use a specific number of contractors. As a result,
sequential search is inferior to simultaneous bidding, as too little design effort is generated
by the former.12
A side issue is whether competition improves welfare or not. Under sequential search,
competition may be in conflict with good incentives for the contractors to choose high
design effort, and reducing competition by imposing a floor on the price of building the
project may be welfare-improving, as noted by PW. Under simultaneous bidding, price
competition helps to achieve the minimum cost in building the desired project. This
suggests that competition itself may not be the culprit for social inefficiency. Rather, the
ability to commit to a mechanism could be the key to improving social welfare.
6 Asymmetric Information
We now relax the assumption that contractors are homogeneous in their building costs
and examine the impact of asymmetric information. This is relevant if the projects are
specific and contractors learn about their building costs when producing the design.
Suppose contractor i’s building cost, γi ∈ [0, γ¯], is the private information of contrac-
tor i and is revealed to i after the design effort is sunk.13 Assume that a contractor’s
building cost is independent of his design effort and is observed privately at zero cost.
The underlying random variable Γi is identically and independently distributed according
to a continuous and differentiable distribution function G(·), with density g(·). Suppose
12PW note that if the government and the contractors could commit to a sufficiently large fine in case a
contractor shirking in design is detected, equilibrium with high effort is obtained under sequential search.
But such mechanism requires substantial commitment and enforcement power of both sides.
13The private building cost is revealed to him even if the sampled contractor has chosen low design
effort.
10
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V is sufficiently large so that for every γ a non-degenerate equilibrium may exist under
simultaneous bidding.14
For simultaneous bidding, suppose the procurer uses a second price auction instead
of a first price auction so that truthful bidding is an equilibrium in (weakly) dominant
strategies.15 Different from our results in Section 3, the government may shortlist more
than two contractors in equilibrium. Shortlisting more contractors leads to higher total
design and search costs, while having more contractors at the bidding stage leads to a lower
expected building price. The trade-off between the two determines the optimal number of
shortlisted contractors. As long as the benefit from sampling one extra contractor is larger
than its cost c+ s, the government will increase the number of shortlisted contractors.
Denote by Γe(i:n) as the the expected value of the ith lowest order statistic of n random
variables, each distributed independently and identically according to G(·). n is the
optimal number of contractors to be shortlisted only if 16
Γe(2:n−1) − Γe(2:n) ≥ c+ s, and Γe(2:n) − Γe(2:n+1) ≤ c+ s (2)
are satisfied. In Condition (2), Γe(2:n−1) − Γe(2:n) captures the expected decrease of the
building price if n contractors instead of n − 1 contractors participate in the bidding
stage.
Lemma 5. When building costs are private information of the contractors and are re-
vealed to them only after design effort is sunk, the optimal number of contractors for the
government to sample is characterized by Condition (2).
If γ is distributed uniformly on [0, 1], the optimal n is given by
√
2
c+ s
+
1
4
− 3
2
≤ n ≤
√
2
c+ s
+
1
4
− 1
2
(3)
Expected procurement cost for the procurer is
Kc = Γe(2:n) + n(c+ s) (4)
Proof. For uniform distribution with g(t) = 1 and G(t) = t, the first part of Condition
(2) can be rewritten as
∫ 1
0
t(n− 1)(n− 2)t(1− t)n−3dt−
∫ 1
0
t(n− 1)nt(1− t)n−2dt ≥ c+ s
⇔2
∫ 1
0
(1− t)n−1dt− 2
∫ 1
0
(1− t)ndt ≥ c+ s
⇔ 2
n(n+ 1)
≥ c+ s
14As in the case with homogeneous building costs, a degenerate equilibrium exists under both simul-
taneous bidding and sequential search, and we focus on nondegenerate equilibria.
15This replacement is purely for the purpose of easy exposition. Revenue equivalence holds in this
setting. That is, given the same number of sampled contractors, the government’s expected payoff from
a first-price auction is identical to that of a second-price auction.
16Note that g(2:n)(x), the density of the second lowest order statistic, is equal to n(n− 1)g(x)G(x)(1−
G(x))n−2 . First part of Condition (2) becomes
∫ γ¯
0
t(n − 1)(n − 2)g(t)G(t)(1 − G(t))n−3dt − ∫ γ¯
0
t(n −
1)ng(t)G(t)(1−G(t))n−2dt ≥ c+ s.
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This gives the upper bound on optimal n ≤
√
2
c+s
+ 1
4
− 1
2
. Similarly, the second part of
Condition (2) gives 2
(n+1)(n+2)
≤ c + s. From this, one gets the lower bound of optimal
n ≥
√
2
c+s
+ 1
4
− 3
2
. The expected procurement cost is the sum of the expected building
cost, which is equal to the expected second lowest production cost among the n sam-
pled contractors, plus the total search cost and design reimbursement of the n sampled
contractors.
Note that the optimal n is larger than two if c + s < 1
6
. This is different from the
symmetric information case where it is optimal for the procurer to sample exactly two
contractors.
Under sequential search with the presence of asymmetric information, the procurer
determines an optimal stopping rule p¯ for the building contract. If the building price
quoted by a sampled contractor exceeds p¯, the procurer samples the next contractor. If
the quoted price is below p¯, the procurer stops searching and awards the building contract
to that contractor. Suppose that any sampled contractor chooses high design effort with
probability 1. Given any stopping rule p¯ of the procurer, a contractor on being sampled
infers that he is either the first contractor the procurer has sampled or all the previously
sampled contractors have quoted a price above p¯. Thus, he quotes a price above p¯ if his
marginal cost is above p¯, and quotes a price equal to p¯ if his marginal cost is below p¯.
Consider an equilibrium where the equilibrium design fee is equal to the cost of high
design effort c. The procurer chooses the optimal stopping rule p¯ to minimize her expected
total cost p¯ + 1
G(p¯)
(c + s), where 1
G(p¯)
is the number of contractors the procurer expects
to sample until she finds a contractor with a quote below p¯. For uniform distribution on
[0, 1], G(p¯) = p¯ and the optimal stopping rule for the buyer is p¯ =
√
c+ s. For a sampled
contractor, choosing high design effort leads to a payoff equal to
c− c+G(p¯)E[p¯− γ | γ < p¯] = 1
2
(c+ s). (5)
The third term on the LHS of (5) is a sampled contractor’s expected payoff when he has
a marginal building cost below p¯, and expects to get the building contract at price equal
to p¯. If a sampled contractor chooses low design effort, he will receive the design fee c.
On top of that, if he is the first sampled contractor, which happens with probability G(p¯),
and at the same time has a marginal cost below p¯, which also happens with probability
G(p¯), he will be awarded the contract at price p¯. In any other cases, he either has a
marginal cost above p¯, thus not getting the contract, or provides a design which does not
match with a design provided by other sampled contractors. Thus, choosing low design
effort leads to an expected payoff equal to
c+G(p¯)2E[p¯− γ | γ < p¯] = c+ 1
2
(c+ s)3/2. (6)
A sampled contractor chooses high design effort if and only if (5) is larger than (6).
In a competitive equilibrium where the design fee is driven down to its marginal cost c,
contractors will choose high design effort if and only if
s ≥ c+ (c+ s)3/2. (7)
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Note that in (7), LHS is constant with respect to c, RHS increases in c. If s < 1, the
inequality (7) holds when c = 0, but fails when c becomes sufficiently large. Therefore, if
s < 1, there exists a c¯ > 0 such that
s = c¯+ (c¯+ s)3/2. (8)
(7) holds if c ≤ c¯ and fails if c > c¯. This is intuitive because if the design cost is high,
a sampled contractor’s benefit from shirking on design effort gets large, thus it is more
difficult to elicit the right design from a sampled contractor. Summarizing the result, we
get:
Lemma 6. If building costs are the contractors’ private information and are revealed to
them only after design effort is sunk, under sequential search, there exists a non-degenerate
equilibrium in which sampled contractors always choose high design effort if the search cost
and design cost are sufficiently low (s < 1 and c ≤ c¯).
Even in the absence of commitment, low enough search and design costs provide
incentives for the procurer to search for low building costs, which provide incentives for
contractors to exert high design effort with probability 1. If the search and/or design
costs are high, then contractors choose high design effort with probability less than 1 as
they do when homogeneous building costs are public information.
Proposition 4. Suppose γi is identically and uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. If s < 1,
c < c¯ and c+ s ≤ 1
3
, sequential search dominates simultaneous bidding.
Proof. Under simultaneous bidding, the expected procurement cost for the buyer is 2
n+1
+
n(c + s). When c + s ≤ 1
3
, the optimal n ≥ 2. Under sequential search, the expected
procurement cost is 2
√
c+ s. Comparing the two costs delivers the claimed result.
When the search cost and design cost are sufficiently low, inefficiency due to lack of
commitment is overcome by the procurer’s incentive to search for low building costs. The
optimal stopping rule under sequential search serves as a substitute for a reserve price
under simultaneous bidding, as the stopping rule optimally restricts the winning price
below the second lowest cost. As a result, sequential search ensures a lower building price.
Furthermore, in expectation, a smaller number of contractors is sampled to achieve a price
below the stopping price. Moreover, in comparison to simultaneous bidding with reserve
where the contract may not be awarded, sequential search with an optimal stopping rule
“fails gracefully” — the procurer continues to search as long as the building price is not
sufficiently low.17 We conclude this section with a numerical example.
Example 1. Suppose γi is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], s = 0.04 and c = 0.0225 < c¯ =
0.023. Under simultaneous bidding, sampling five contractors is optimal for the procurer.
The total expected procurement cost for the procurer is 0.645. Under sequential search,
the procurer sets a reservation price (stopping rule) equal to 0.25 and in expectation four
contractors need to be sampled to get a quote below 0.25. The total expected procurement
cost for the procurer is 0.5.
17If the building cost is related to the complexity of a project, a change in complexity would mean a
shift in the distribution G. For a distribution that does not have a very high mass on high building cost,
the intuition behind sampling multiple contractors for low building price remains the same, and thus, we
would still expect the superiority of sequential search for sufficiently low search and design costs.
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7 Discussions
Alternative Utility Function. Suppose the value of an implemented project to the
procurer depends monotonically on its distance from the best design, for example, V (a, α) =
−β(a − α)2 in which β measures the importance of the right design to the procurer.
If the procurer adopts traditional design-build approach and expects low design effort
from the selected contractor, she would ask for a project with a = 0.5 which minimizes∫ 1
0
β(x−α)2dx. There the expected procurement cost is s+β/12, which is lower than the
cost 2(c+ s) of the simultaneous bidding if β ≤ 24c+ 12s. Thus if the right design is not
particularly important for the procurer, the traditional design-build approach would be
better than simultaneous bidding (and any other mechanisms that elicit high design ef-
forts from multiple contractors). But if design is sufficiently important, ie. β > 24c+12s,
we arrive at the same equilibrium outcome that two contractors are sampled, both invest-
ing high design effort, and only then the proposed designs coincide under simultaneous
bidding.18 The commitment problem in sequential search also remains.
Finite Number of Contractors. Under sequential search, if all the contractors are
sampled and the government does not find a contractor who offers a building price below
p¯, suppose the procurer chooses the supplier whose design matches with at least one
other supplier and quotes the lowest building price, and awards him the building contract
with the minimum of the second lowest bid and the stopping price p¯ (a combination of
search and second price auction). In the case with homogeneous building cost, nothing
changes because only two contractors matter on the equilibrium path. In the case with
private building cost, building price under sequential search would be further driven down
because anticipating that the contractor with lowest quote will be picked conditional on
matched designs, those contractors with marginal cost below the stopping rule will propose
a building price below p¯.
Future Research. One relevant issue we have not analyzed in this paper is that con-
tractors may be heterogeneous in their design costs, or alternatively in their ability of
producing quality designs. This would complicate the analysis, as the firms that are more
efficient at design may have higher/lower building costs. Furthermore, if contractors have
private information regarding both design costs and building costs, screening arises both
at the design stage and the building stage. This constitutes an interesting agenda for
future research.
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